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Abstract 
Lone-actor terrorism is a growing threat in Western European countries as the numbers of 
lone-actor terrorist attacks have multiplied over the last 15 years. However, knowledge on 
this type of terrorism is insufficient. This current study evaluates whether there are any 
common personal, social, psychological, and operational characteristics among lone-actor 
terrorists (LATs) and whether any profile can be drawn in regard to a lone-actor terrorist. 
The authors identified 36 LATs between January 1, 2015, and December 31, 2016, in 
Western European countries through the Global Terrorism Database. The study profiled 
these LATs regarding their sociodemographic characteristics, attack characteristics, 
method of radicalization, ideology, modus operandi, and typology. Findings of this study 
show that lone-actor terrorism in Western Europe has undergone new changes, and 
although there is no single unique profile for LATs, there are common characteristics that 
warrant further studies. 
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Introduction 
 
Although traditional group-based terrorism is still highly active, lone-
actor terrorism is gaining more ground.1 In Western countries, this 
growing threat is even more tangible as the number of lone-actor 
terrorism attacks has multiplied over the last 15 years, and experts 
believe it will become the most prevalent form of terrorism in the 
future.2 According to the European Counter Terrorism Center, lone-
actor terrorism is the most favored type of terrorism by both the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS) and Al Qaeda, and it was a 
major threat for European countries in 2017.3 
 
Moreover, lone-actor terrorism is hard to combat.4 Usually, LATs have 
no obvious contacts with terrorist groups or with elements monitored 
by security and intelligence organizations. As a result, LATs can 
operate without detection before the attack.5 Therefore, any explicit 
information and knowledge about the characteristics of LATs has high 
value for counterterrorism.6 
 
Similar to other criminals, lone-actor terrorists (LATs) and their 
characteristics change over time; as a result, the available knowledge 
about them is insufficient.7 Nevertheless, studies have attempted to 
elucidate different characteristics of LATs.8 Scholars have tried to aid 
policy makers, law enforcement, and the security and intelligence 
apparatus to prevent and counter LATs by using profiling since they 
believe that LATs may have similar characteristics.9  
 
Profiling previous LATs can provide valuable knowledge about which 
individuals may become LATs and which persons are prone to take 
violent actions.10 This knowledge can also explain better why some 
individuals are susceptible to radicalization.11 Therefore, based on the 
Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the objective of this current study is 
to evaluate LATs through criminal profiling. Since terrorist are also 
criminals, we believe that criminological theories and methods are 
applicable to the case of terrorism and terrorists.12 The study will thus 
evaluate LATs’ demographics (age and gender), social (previous 
criminal record, type of criminal record, and migration status), 
psychological (mental and psychological status, social status, ideology, 
radicalization, and typology of LAT), and operational characteristics 
(leakage of information, modus operandi, and whether they are known 
by security and intelligence agencies). 
 
The next section defines important concepts used in this article. The 
third section, Profiling in Terrorism, gives a brief overview of the 
notion of profiling and presents the studied characteristics in this 
article. The fourth section, Data Collection, outlines the methods of the 
study, followed by the results section. The last two sections discuss the 
results and offer a conclusion as well as future implications.  
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Concept Definition 
 
Terrorism 
 
Although there is no consensus on the definition of terrorism, three 
factors are common in most definitions. To deem an action as 
“terrorism,” the action must  
 
1. be illegal according to the laws of the host country,  
2. have political motives, and  
3. be intended to intimidate the public.13  
 
Regarding political motives, the action must aim at attaining political, 
social, or religious objectives. Based on these factors, we define 
terrorism as a violent action or threat against random or selective 
individuals conducted for political motives to influence the public 
through the creation of fear.14 
 
Lone-Actor Terrorism 
 
An LAT is often called a lone-wolf terrorist. In the wild animal world, a 
lone wolf is a wolf that prefers to leave the pack and hunt alone. Thus, a 
lone-wolf terrorist—or, more correctly, a lone-actor terrorist—is an 
individual or a small group of terrorists who operate alone.15 Hence, the 
LAT or LATs plan, organize, and carry out the actions without any 
physical, financial, or other support from a terrorist group or network, 
even though those groups may have inspired the LAT.16 The Countering 
Lone-Actor Terrorism project (CLAT) defines lone-actor terrorism as 
follows:  
 
Threat or use of violence by a single perpetrator (or small cell), 
not acting out of purely personal or material reasons, with the aim 
of influencing a wider audience, and who acts without any direct 
support in the planning, preparation, and execution of the attack, 
and whose decision to act is not directed by any group or other 
individuals although possibly inspired by others.17 
 
Profiling 
 
Although no single definition for criminal profiling exists and scholars 
have given several definitions for this concept, the objective in all 
definitions is similar: To provide useful information to assist law 
enforcement in identifying and locating offenders and detecting 
potential offenders.18 Therefore, profiling is a process of drawing a 
possible image of a likely offender. The foundation of profiling is the 
belief that offenders committing similar crimes also share similar 
characteristics.19 Behavioral consistency theory is the basis of this view, 
and it states that primary traits are stable and general in a way that 
they lead an individual to behave in a specific way across different 
situations. Further, according to the homology assumption, offenders 
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of a specific crime share similar background characteristics.20 Thus, 
Richard Kocsis defines criminal profiling as follows: 
 
The process of identifying personality traits, behavioral 
tendencies, geographic locations, and demographic or biological 
descriptors of an offender based on characteristics of the crime.21  
 
Profiling in Terrorism Studies 
 
In terrorism studies, profiling is a new and understudied discipline that 
has been practiced mainly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.22 Terrorism 
scholars argue that since terrorist groups and networks target specific 
individuals for radicalization, these individuals should have common 
characteristics.23 Accordingly, by identifying these characteristics, 
government agencies may be able to detect individuals at risk for 
radicalization. 
 
On the other hand, some scholars believe that profiling terrorists is 
impossible because their motivations and aims vary.24 However, in 
recent years, profiling terrorists has been widely practiced in both the 
academic field and counterterrorism, and the Council of the European 
Union recommends its members to work together on this specific task 
in order to assist law enforcement to identify and locate probable 
terrorists. According to the recommendation, terrorist profiling is 
about collecting a set of physical, psychological, and behavioral 
characteristics that are common in individuals who engage in terrorist 
activities, and it can aid  predictive practices as well.25 
 
Profiling Lone-Actor Terrorists  
 
Unlike different and sometimes opposing views about terrorism 
profiling in general, when it comes to lone-actor terrorists, there is an 
agreement that LATs may have common specific characteristics.26 
Scholars have argued that this is because of fundamental differences 
between traditional group-based terrorism and lone-actor terrorism. 
The main difference between the two types of terrorism is probably that 
LATs share relatively similar characteristics concerning their personal 
and social characteristics, ideology, modus operandi, and typology.27 
 
Demographics  
 
The age and gender of terrorists are the main personal characteristics 
that terrorism scholars study, just like criminologists examining other 
types of violent crimes. In criminology, offence varies with age, and 
young males have a stronger tendency toward high-risk violent 
activities than females.28 Studies in terrorism show that most terrorist 
group members are males who join the groups when they are young.29 
However, in relation to LATs, previous studies indicate that LATs tend 
to be older than traditional group-based terrorists are. One study from 
the CLAT project on 120 LATs between 2000 and 2014 in Europe 
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showed that all the included LATs were male with an average age of 
close to 30.30 Another study on 119 LATs between 1990 and 2013 in the 
United States and Europe supports these findings, stating that 98 
percent of the identified LATs were male and that the average age was 
33.31 Moreover, some studies state that the age of an LAT depends on 
his/her ideology and can thus be different.32 Therefore, based on 
previous studies, LATs are likely to be male and older than traditional 
group-based terrorists are. 
 
Social characteristics 
 
Having previous criminal record is one of the similarities between both 
terrorists and violent criminals.33 Concerning LATs though, the 
frequency of this factor is not high. While, for example, a study by the 
CLAT project found that only 33 percent of the sample of LATs (n=120) 
had a previous criminal record, another study found that this factor 
varies based on the ideology of the offender and is less viable among 
Islamist LATs.34 Previous criminal record is thus a non-specific factor 
in LATs. 
 
Psychological Characteristics 
 
Mental and psychological status is another personal characteristic often 
discussed regarding LATs.35 Considering a terrorist as an individual 
with mental disorders is common among both the mass media and the 
public.36 This is especially the case for LATs since they are often 
socially isolated individuals.37 Gruenewald and his colleagues found 
that 40 percent of 70 right wing LATs in the United States between 
1990 and 2008 had mental disorders.38 Spaaij noted that mental illness 
is an important factor and that the social isolation of LATs is, in fact, 
the result of their mental disorders.39 On the other hand, a study of 119 
LATs showed that only 32 percent of them had mental disorders.40 A 
study from the CLAT project also states that only 35 percent of the 
LATs had mental disorders, and Perry and his colleagues argued that 
mental disorder varies among LATs with different ideologies.41 
Although there is no consensus regarding frequency and the role of 
mental disorders among LATs, the majority of studies state that mental 
disorders among LATs are relatively more common in comparison to 
traditional group-based terrorists. 
 
Regarding social status, studies claim that LATs are more likely to be 
socially isolated.42 They tend to be single and live alone. They do not 
have friends and might have problems with their parents as well.43 For 
instance, Gill and his colleagues found that just more than half (52 
percent) of their identified LATs (n=120) were socially isolated.44 On 
the other hand, some studies show that being socially isolated is not 
common among LATs. The study by the CLAT project and the study by 
Perry et al. showed that only 29 percent and 30 percent of the LATs, 
respectively, had been socially isolated.45 Consequently, despite 
opposite views regarding this variable, it is clear that social isolation 
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may be more common among LATs in comparison to traditional group-
based terrorists. 
 
Ideology is an important factor when discussing LATs.46 In most lone-
actor terrorism studies, ideology has been the most powerful 
provocative factor for the actors.47 For instance, both the study by Gill 
et al. and the study by the CLAT project showed that ideology plays a 
key role, and more than 70 percent of the LATs were ideologically 
motivated.48 Consequently, some scholars categorize LATs by their 
ideology.49  
 
In discussing the role of ideology in lone-actor terrorism, radicalization 
is an important concept. It is the process of fundamental changes in an 
individual’s beliefs, where the individual gradually adopts extreme 
views about political, social, or religious matters and tends to justify the 
use of extreme violence as a solution.50 For LATs, who in most cases do 
not have any direct contact with a radical group or individual, 
radicalization usually happens via the Internet, especially through 
social media.51 By providing a safe and secure platform on which to 
connect with other like-minded individuals, the Internet increases the 
likelihood of self-radicalization for LATs.52 The aforementioned study 
by the CLAT project showed that more than half (54 percent) of the 
LATs in its sample (n=120) used the Internet to obtain training 
knowledge.53 As a result, the Internet and social media are an 
important way of radicalizing LATs. 
 
Regarding the typology of LATs, Pantucci proposed a typology for 
characterizing Islamist LATs.54 It divided them into three different 
types: Loner, lone wolf, and lone-wolf pack. Although this typology 
foremost applies to Islamist LATs, it can also be used in discussing all 
types of LATs, which is why it is used in this study. Loner, in Pantucci’s 
typology, refers to individuals with an extreme ideology who carry out 
their attacks without having any direct or real contact with a radicalized 
person or an extremist group. This type of LAT usually becomes radical 
via the Internet and social media. The lone wolf is an individual who 
has had some contact with a terrorist group or extremist network but 
planned, organized, and carried out his/her actions entirely alone. The 
lone-wolf pack has the same characteristics as loners except that they 
comprise more than one individual and, in fact, are a small cell. 
Pantucci also proposed a fourth typology, lone attackers. We do not use 
this last typology in this study since lone attackers are members of a 
terrorist group and receive orders to undertake a terrorist attack alone. 
Therefore, they do not fit the definition of lone-actor terrorists. 
Generally, LATs tend to be loners.55 In Teich’s study, which included 73 
Islamist LATs between 1990 and 2013 in the United States and 
Western Europe, 55 percent were loners, 24 percent were lone wolves, 
and 21 percent were in lone-wolf packs.56 
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Operational Characteristics 
 
Scholars argue that investigating the modus operandi of LATs provides 
useful knowledge for counterterrorism activities.57 Accordingly, 
weapon, target, victim, frequency of attacks, and number of attackers 
are of importance. Previous studies show that LATs tend to use 
firearms more than any other weapon in their attacks.58 Between 1968 
and 2014, firearms were the most common weapon used by LATs in the 
United States and Europe and caused the most harm to civilians.59 
 
Regarding selecting targets and victims, LATs typically target civilians. 
According to a study from the CLAT project, LATs in Europe between 
2000 and 2014 killed 195 people and injured 449, and most of them 
were civilians.60 In other studies, civilians were also the most common 
target of LATs and the second most common were government 
employees, such as the police.61 
 
The last factor examined in previous studies is leakage of information, 
which refers to the intentional or unintentional leaking of information 
because of the behavior or action of the LAT, thus revealing his/her 
violent intentions. LATs typically have poor operational security and, 
generally, tend to leak information about their intentions.62 According 
to a study from the CLAT project, 44 percent of its sample (n=120), on 
some level, informed others about their tendencies for violent activities 
and radical actions.63 In Gill et al.’s sample (n=119), 64 percent of the 
LATs revealed their tendencies to engage in terrorist activities to their 
families and friends.64 
 
Although there are many significant common characteristics and traits 
among lone-actor terrorists, most of the studies above concluded that it 
is not possible to present one single comprehensive profile of an LAT.65 
Despite this diversity, there are some distinguishable differences 
between subgroups of lone-actors. Moreover, making the effort to 
characterize lone actors will uncover beneficial and useful facts for 
combating terrorism.66 
 
Data Collection 
 
In this cross-sectional study, we collected data from secondary open 
sources. Since accessing primary sources in terrorism studies is 
difficult, using secondary sources is common.67 We collected the main 
data from the GTD, created by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Response to Terrorism and which contains 
information on all terrorist incidents around the world. The 
information available includes the date of the attack, the location, the 
number of fatalities and injuries, the type of attack, the weapon used, 
the victim or target, and the ideology of the terrorist. The GTD collects 
its data from open sources such as media archives, existing data sets, 
and legal documents.68 
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Unfortunately, some data were missing at the GTD. These data 
included demographic information about the terrorist—such as age, 
migration status, leakage of information, previous criminal record, 
radicalization process, social status, mental health status, and whether 
the LAT was known or unknown by intelligence agencies. We manually 
gathered these variables from secondary open sources, specifically 
media and news websites based on a nonsystematic search. 
 
Sample and Analysis 
 
Previous researchers have already studied LATs between 1968 and 
2014 in the United States and Europe.69 Therefore, the focus of this 
present study is on lone-actor terrorism from the beginning of 2015 
until the end of 2016. In collecting data, we searched the GTD’s dataset 
for terrorist attacks categorized as LAT attacks in 23 Western European 
countries (Appendix A). We selected these countries because most of 
the LAT attacks between 2000 and 2014 in Europe took place in 
Western European countries.70 After searching basic information about 
the attacks and their respective LATs on the GTD, we searched the 
name of the LAT or the name of the incident to find other variables and 
to validate the findings; we searched at least three different open-
source media for each case. 
 
We analyzed the GTD database and other secondary open-source 
media to identify the required variables based on a codebook 
(Appendix B). We then analyzed all the gathered variables based on the 
same codebook, which we developed by reviewing previous studies. 
Appendix B defines all the variables and their sub-categories. 
 
Results 
 
Attack Characteristics 
 
We identified 37 lone-actor terrorist attacks (36 actual attacks and one 
plot). Most of the attacks were carried out in France (n=14; 37 percent), 
followed by Germany (n=10; 27 percent) and the United Kingdom 
(n=5; 14 percent). Of the 37 attacks, the majority (n=22; 60.5 percent) 
were armed assaults (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Characteristics of the attacks 
 
Attack 
characteristics 
 Prevalence  Percent 
Attack/plot N 37 100 
Country of attack France 14 37 
 Germany 10 27 
 United Kingdom 5 14 
 Denmark 3 7.5 
 Sweden 2 5.5 
 Belgium 1 3 
 Italy 1 3 
 Spain 1 3 
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Type of attack Armed assault 22 60.5 
 Bombing 3 7.5 
 Unarmed assault 3 7.5 
 Assassination 3 7.5 
 Hostage taking 3 7.5 
 Facility 2 5.5 
 Kidnapping  1 3 
 Hijacking 1 3 
Source: Global Terrorism Database. 
 
LAT Characteristics 
 
Of the 36 identified LATs, 35 were male. The age of the LATs varied 
between 12 and 52, with the median age being 24. Most of the LATs 
(n=16; 45 percent) were between 21 and 30 years old. Also, most of the 
LATs (n=20; 56 percent) had no previous criminal record. Only 15 
LATs (41.5 percent) had committed previous act of crime. Violent 
crimes were the most common type of previous criminal act (n=8; 22.5 
percent). 
 
Regarding mental health status, information was available for 33 LATs. 
Most of them (n=24; 67 percent) had no prior or current mental health 
issues, while a quarter of the LATs (n=9; 25 percent) had a confirmed 
history of mental health disorders before or at the time of the attack. 
Concerning social status, no information was available for seven LATs. 
Of the remaining 29 LATs, 13 (36 percent) were socially isolated at the 
time of the attack. Further, seven of the 13 LATs with social isolation 
also had mental health disorders.  
 
Regarding migration status, only six LATs (16 percent) were natives of 
the country they attacked. Eleven LATs (31 percent) were second-
generation immigrants. Nine (25 percent) were first-generation 
immigrants, seven (19 percent) were 1.5-generation immigrants in the 
place of the attack, and only two were refugees (Table 2). 
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Table 2. Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists 
 
Offender 
characteristics 
 Prevalence Percent 
Lone-Actor 
terrorists 
N 36 100 
Age 11-20 10 28 
 21-30 16 45 
 31-40 8 22 
 41-50 1 2.5 
 51-60 1 2.5 
Gender Male 35 97.5 
 Female 1 2.5 
Previous 
criminal record 
Positive 15 41.5 
 Negative 20 56 
 Unknown 1 2.5 
Type of criminal 
record 
Armed robbery  3 8 
 Drug 
using/trafficking  
6 17 
 Violence 8 22.5 
 Theft 5 14 
 Gang related 1 2.5 
 Radical activity  1 2.5 
Mental health Having mental 
disorder 
9 25 
 No mental disorder 24 67 
 Unknown 3 8 
Social status Isolated 13 36 
 Not isolated 16 45 
 Unknown 7 19 
Social isolation 
with mental 
disorder 
Positive 7 20 
 Negative  6 17 
Migration status  Second generation 
immigrant 
11 31 
 First generation 
immigrant 
9 25 
 1.5-generation 
immigrant  
7 19 
 Native  6 16 
 Refuge 2 5.5 
 Unknown 1 2.5 
Known by 
security and 
intelligence 
agencies 
 9 25 
 Under monitoring 3 8 
 Under surveillance 1 2.5 
Source: Authors gathered the information from open sources. 
 
Radicalization and Ideology 
 
Most of the LATs (n=27; 75 percent) had radical Islamic views. The 
second most common ideology was a right wing ideology, which 
included four LATs (11 percent). The radicalization process of ten LATs 
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(28 percent) is unknown. Fourteen LATs (40 percent) were radicalized 
via social media and the Internet. Four LATs (12 percent) were 
radicalized in prison, three (9 percent) through a personal network, two 
(5.5 percent) through community network, and two others were 
radicalized by contacting a terrorist group. Finally, 25 percent of all 
LATs were known by the intelligence and security agencies at the time 
of their attack (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. Ideology and Radicalization of Lone-Actor Terrorists 
 
Ideology and 
radicalization 
characteristics 
 Prevalence Percent 
Lone-Actor 
terrorists 
N 36 100 
Radicalization Internet 14 40 
 Prison 4 12 
 Personal network 3 8 
 Community 
Network 
2 5 
 Actual group 1 2 
 Non radicalized 1 2 
 Unknown 10 28 
Ideology Right wing 4 11 
 Anti-Muslim 2 5.5 
 Anti-Semitic 1 3 
 Unknown 2 5.5 
 Islamist 27 75 
Source: Global Terrorism Database and information gathered by the authors from 
open sources. 
 
Modus Operandi and Typology  
 
A knife was the most common weapon used by the LATs (n=16; 44 
percent), and only a quarter of them (n=9; 25 percent) used firearms. 
Regarding fatalities, overall, 128 people died because of these attacks, 
and 571 others were injured. Civilians were the target of 37 percent of 
the LATs. For 28 percent of the LATs, politicians, governmental places, 
and public servants were the targets, while the other 28 percent 
targeted religious figures and institutions (Table 4). Furthermore, the 
loner was the most common type of LATs in this study (n=15; 42 
percent), then the lone wolf (n=12; 33.5 percent), and then the lone 
wolf pack (n=8; 22 percent) (Table 5).  
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Table 4. Modus Operandi of Lone-Actor Terrorists 
 
Modus operandi 
characteristic  
 Prevalence Percent 
Lone-Actor 
terrorists 
N 36 100 
Type of weapon Firearm 9 25 
 Knife 16 44 
 Vehicle 3 7 
 Incendiary/Arson 4 11 
 Explosive 5 13 
Target/Victim Civilian 13 37 
 Government 10 28 
 Religious 
figure/Institution 
10 28 
 Private business 3 8 
 Education 
institution  
2 6 
 Unknown 1 2 
Fatality N 128 100 
Injury N 571 100 
Leakage of 
Information 
Unknown  16 45 
 Positive 6 17 
 Negative 14 38 
Source: Global Terrorism Database and information gathered by the authors from 
open sources. 
 
Table 5. Typology of lone-actor terrorists 
 
Typology  Prevalence Percent 
Lone-Actor 
terrorists 
N 36 100 
Typology Loner 15 42 
 Lone wolf 12 33.5 
 Lone-wolf pack 8 22 
 Unknown 1 2.5 
Source: Authors gathered the information from open sources. 
 
LATs Based on Ideology 
 
Regarding the relationship between attack characteristics and ideology, 
the majority of the attacks (n=28; 76 percent) were carried out as the 
result of Radical Islamic ideology. Right wing ideology, anti-Muslim 
ideology, and anti-Semitic ideology accounted for eleven percent, five 
and a half percent, and two percent of the attacks, respectively. Most of 
the Islamic ideology attacks were undertaken in France (n=12; 33 
percent), followed by Germany (n=8; 22 percent) and the United 
Kingdom (n=3; 8 percent). Right wing LATs targeted Germany in two 
out of the four right wing attacks. The other two right wing attacks took 
place in Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 
Armed assault was the most common type of attack among Islamist 
LATs (n=16; 43 percent). Twenty-Eight percent of the Islamist LATs 
(n=10) targeted civilians in their attacks. The second most common 
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target of Islamist LATs (n=9; 25 percent) was religious figures and 
institutions, while the third was governmental institutions (n=6; 17 
percent). 
 
Of the 128 fatalities, Islamist LATs were responsible for 115 (90 
percent) deaths, while right wing LATs were responsible for the 
remaining fatalities. Islamist LATs also injured the majority (n=531; 93 
percent) of the people. Right wing LATs accounted for the remaining 
casualties. 
 
Regarding leakage of information, all six LATs who leaked information 
about their attacks or their intentions were Islamists. A majority of the 
LATs in the most common age group (21–30) were Islamists (n=14; 39 
percent). Islamist LATs were also the most common actors in the age 
group 10–20 (n=8; 22 percent). Moreover, the youngest LAT was an 
Islamist, while the oldest was right wing LATs. Regarding previous 
criminal record, 10 of 15 LATs who had previous criminal records were 
Islamists, while only one of the right wing LATs had a previous 
criminal record. The other two were anti-Muslim and anti-Semitic.  
 
Furthermore, most LATs suffering from mental disorders were 
Islamists (n=5). Half of the right-wing LATs had mental disorders 
(n=2). Regarding social status, Islamist LATs were isolated to a higher 
degree (n=8). Moreover, three out of four right-wing actors were also 
socially isolated.  
 
Of the eleven second-generation immigrant LATs, nine were Islamists. 
Additionally, Islamist LATs constituted the majority of the first-
generation immigrants (seven out of nine). Most of the right-wing LATs 
were native (n=3), and both refugee LATs were Islamist. Islamist LATs 
also constituted the majority of the LATs known by intelligence and 
security agencies (eight out of nine). 
 
The majority of LATs who were radicalized via social media and the 
Internet were Islamists (n=12), while the other two were right wing. 
The majority of the loner types of LATs were Islamists (n=9; 25 
percent). Islamist LATs were also the majority in the lone-wolf type 
(n=10; 28 percent), and all of the eight lone-wolf-pack individuals were 
Islamists (22 percent). Regarding right wing LATs, the majority were 
loners (n=3). 
 
Discussion  
 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate whether there are common 
characteristics among LATs. Our findings show that LAT attacks are 
rapidly increasing and confirm other studies’ statements that this type 
of terrorism is becoming more prevalent.71 While there were 198 LAT 
attacks and plots between 1968 and 2010 in Western Europe and the 
United States and 98 attacks and plots between 2000 and 2014 all 
around Europe, this study shows that during only two years, 2015 and 
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2016, LATs carried out 37 attacks in Western European countries 
alone.72 Why LAT attacks have increased is not clear. However, it might 
be attributable to massive propaganda by terrorist groups, encouraging 
their sympathizers to act alone since it is more difficult for law 
enforcement to detect them.73 Moreover, unlike the results from the 
CLAT study showing that the United Kingdom has been the prime 
target for LATs, the results of this study show that France has recently 
become the prime target for LATs.74 
 
Characteristics of LATs 
 
Regarding the personal characteristics of LATs, the findings show 
variations in comparison to previous results. The age of LATs has 
decreased during the past three years; while the average age of LATs 
was 29.7 in the CLAT study and 33 in the study by Gill et al., our study 
indicates the average age has declined to 24 years.75 The age of the 
youngest and the oldest LAT has also decreased from 15 and 74 in the 
CLAT study to 12 and 52 in our study.76 This indicates that the age of 
radicalization and engaging in violent political activities in Western 
Europe is decreasing. The large number of Islamist LATs included in 
this study and the fact that Islamist LATs tend to be younger may 
explain this finding.77 The high use of the Internet and massive 
propaganda by terrorist groups can be another reason since they tend 
to affect young individuals active on the Internet.78 Shehabat et al. have 
previously shown that social media is the primary space where 
communication between radicalized individuals takes place and where 
propaganda that inspires lone-wolf attacks circulates.79 
 
In contrast to previous studies, where previous criminal records are a 
non-specific factor, our study acknowledges the important role of this 
factor, at least in the past three years.80 Our results show that criminals 
have a greater tendency to engage in political violence. However, the 
type of previous criminal record is still a non-specific factor. A report 
from GLOBSEC supports our finding, discussing both LATs and group 
based terrorism and indicating that individuals with a criminal record 
are more prone to engage in terrorist activities.81 
 
However, unlike traditional group-based terrorists, criminal gang 
members are less likely to become LATs.82 Lone-actor terrorism is 
more about individuals acting for non-personal purposes, whereas 
engaging in terrorism for gang members is not a political or ideological 
decision but rather in line with their personal financial or social 
interests, such as engaging in drug or arms trafficking.83 
 
Unlike previous results, our study findings show that mental disorders 
are not common among LATs as only a quarter (25 percent) of LATs in 
this study suffered from a mental disorder.84 Previous studies show 
that the frequency of mental disorders among LATs varies with respect 
to ideology. While the frequency of mental disorder among right wing 
LATs is high, it is low among Islamist LATs.85 Accordingly, the low 
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percentage of mental disorders in our study is not surprising since 
most of the LATs in this study are Islamists.    
 
Regarding social status, our results are in line with previous findings: 
This factor is more specific than mental health status.86 From a 
criminological point of view, this supports Hirschi’s social bond theory, 
which claims criminal activity is the result of lack of social bond with 
others (including family, friends, community, and social institutions 
such as school and employers).87 Based on this theory, the lack of social 
ties—or what this study refers to as social isolation—can lead to 
criminogenic behaviors. However, unlike previous results, the 
combination of social isolation and mental disorders is not a specific 
factor in our study, as half of the socially isolated LATs had no mental 
ill health.88  
 
To our knowledge, no previous studies have considered migration 
status as a factor regarding LATs. Of the 36 LATs in this study, 24 were 
native, 1.5-generation, or second-generation immigrants in the target 
country. Mainstream narrative claims that frustration and anger in 
both 1.5 and second-generation immigrants in the host society may 
lead to their susceptibility to radicalization.89 However, contrary to 
public opinion and the claim of mainstream media, this study’s finding 
clearly shows that it is not immigrants who are responsible for LAT 
attacks; in fact, most of the LATs in this study were born and grew up 
in the target countries and took part in their educational system and 
values.  
 
Another factor overlooked by previous studies is the level of 
information that the intelligence and security agencies had on the LAT 
before the attack. In counterterrorism, collecting and analyzing 
intelligence is vital, and monitoring suspicious individuals and 
activities is one of the best ways to collect data. Therefore, the ability of 
someone monitored by or known to authorities to undertake an attack 
represents a failure for the security agencies of that country. Although 
we could not acquire the number of individuals monitored during the 
specific time of this study in order to compare the results, it is still of 
interest that nine of the 37 LATs included in this study were able to 
continue with their attack despite being known and in some cases even 
monitored by security and intelligence agencies. This supports the 
belief that radicalization is a gradual and developmental process from 
the point of being radicalized to the point of taking action.90 This time 
in between is highly useful for intelligence and security agencies to 
monitor, identify, and possibly arrest the individual.  
 
Ideology and Radicalization 
 
Regarding the radicalization process and the role of the Internet, this 
study supports previous literatures and results.91 The Internet and 
social media have become a haven for LATs to discuss and nurture 
radical views without detection by an intelligence agency.92 Indeed, 
ISIS used the concept of “e-jihad” to encourage their sympathizers and 
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followers to be active on social media, particularly the apps Telegram 
and Twitter.93  
 
Regarding ideology, our findings agree with previous results that 
radical Islamic views are the most common ideology expressed by 
LATs.94 This may illuminate the effectiveness of the political 
circumstances and the propaganda of radical Islamic groups in 
converting individuals to LATs. Another reason may be that radical 
Islamic groups are more organized than those of radical right and left 
wing groups. 
 
Modus Operandi and Typology  
 
Regarding modus operandi, the present results show a significant 
change among LATs. While the use of a firearm has always been the 
most common modus operandi, this study shows that the knife has 
replaced firearm as the most common weapon in attacks.95 Moreover, 
firearm is no longer the most lethal weapon. In the two attacks with the 
most fatalities (77 percent of the total) and injured (84 percent of the 
total), the weapon used was a vehicle. These results indicate the 
increasing possibility of conducting an LAT attack without any special 
or sophisticated weapon while simultaneously making it more difficult 
to prevent these kinds of attacks. 
 
Another interesting result in our study has to do with the question of 
information leakage. Although this variable was unknown for 45 
percent of the LATs, unlike previous studies, only a minority of the 
LATs (n=6) did in fact leak information about their attacks.96 This 
shows that the previous opinion, claiming that LATs typically have poor 
operational security, has changed and is, at least in our study, not 
true.97 While the CLAT study and the study by Gill et al. showed that 44 
percent and 64 percent of the LATs, respectively, leaked information, 
our finding shows that only 17 percent of the LATs leaked 
information.98  
 
Regarding the typology of LATs, findings of this study are in line with 
previous results: Most of the LATs are loners, which also explains why 
most of the LATs in this study were radicalized via the Internet. 
However, the number of lone-wolf actors in the present study is 
interestingly higher in comparison to an earlier study, which shows 
that radical and terrorist groups are highly active in Western Europe in 
trying to radicalize more individuals.99 
 
LATs Based on Ideology 
 
The absolute majority of the LATs were Islamists (n=27; 75 percent). 
Consequently, the numbers of other ideologies were low, and we cannot 
make effective conclusions about them. However, there are some 
interesting findings.  
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First, while Islamist LATs mainly targeted civilians, they were 
simultaneously the LAT group that mostly targeted governmental 
employees, predominately police officers. Although one right wing LAT 
did target a politician as a government employee, interestingly, none of 
the right wing actors targeted members of the police force. However, 
the number of Islamic LATs in this study being higher than right wing 
LATs may have affected this observation. 
 
Second, the frequency of mental disorders among Islamist LATs 
relative to their numbers is low; only five (19 percent) Islamic LATs 
suffered from mental issues. This supports earlier findings about 
mental disorders being uncommon among Islamist LATs.100  
 
Third, regarding social status, our findings are also in line with 
previous results. While most of the right wing LATs were socially 
isolated, only 30 percent of the Islamist LATs were socially isolated, 
possibly due to the strong social bonds and ties that radical Islamists 
have with their families and their community.101 
 
Fourth, regarding migration status, our results are in line with previous 
literatures discussing group-based terrorism.102 The absolute majority 
of Islamist LATs was second-generation immigrants or at least grew up 
in the targeted country as 1.5-generation immigrants. This is perhaps 
one the major challenges of the contemporary western world; How to 
stop homegrown radicalization? 
 
Fifth, only nine LATs were familiar to the security agencies. This 
number, however, is not enough for a strong indication. Interestingly, 
90 percent of them (eight out of nine) were Islamist. This may indicate 
that Islamist LATs are more likely to engage in radical activities than 
other known radical individuals or groups. 
 
Limitations 
 
Since accessing primary data in terrorism research is problematic, we 
had to rely on secondary data. This is a limitation because it is less 
reliable than primary data.103 However, since options other than 
secondary sources are relatively limited in terrorism studies, using 
secondary sources is common; most of the research and articles on 
terrorism have relied on secondary sources.104 While most 
criminologists use official data, victimization data, or self-reported data 
for their quantitative studies, researchers discussing terrorism cannot 
operate in the same way since intelligence and security agencies cannot 
by law to share their data and information. Moreover, focusing on the 
victim and victimization data is difficult due to the nature of the 
criminal act. For obvious reasons, self-reported data on terrorists are 
not possible to gather. In using secondary open sources, there are two 
main problems: The question of the accuracy of the information and 
the question of neutrality and the level of bias. To diminish the risk of 
these two pitfalls, we have used different open sources to check the 
correctness of the information. 
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The small sample used in this study is another limitation. 
Consequently, larger generalizations should be made with caution. This 
is especially the case since the sample includes only nine non-Islamist 
LATs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We evaluated whether there are common characteristics among LATs 
conducting terrorist attacks in Western European countries during 
2015–2016. The findings of this study confirm that lone-actor 
terrorism is a growing threat for Western European countries, and 
although there is no single comprehensive profile for LATs, there are 
common characteristics among them. Contrary to views about the 
inefficiency of profiling in terrorism, our results illustrate that profiling 
as a method can lead us to valuable knowledge about and a better 
understanding of the phenomenon of lone-actor terrorism; it can also 
allow us to plan more effective counterterrorism strategies and policies. 
However, profiling is not a crime solver by itself, particularly in 
discussing terrorism. Researchers use profiling in terrorism partly to 
help law enforcement to focus on a particular set of offenders and 
partly to help law enforcement with better and more effective risk 
management. As a result, by analyzing noteworthy information on 
previous LATs, profiling can provide public institutions, policy makers, 
and even security and intelligence organizations with substantial 
knowledge on the possible characteristics and traits of lone-actor 
terrorists.  
 
Future studies should focus on criminal profiling in terrorism studies. 
This warrants a closer collaboration between the disciplines of 
criminology and terrorism studies and more studies on profiling in the 
area of terrorism. Since different circumstances affect terrorists, 
studies should also focus on the modus operandi in relation to different 
characteristics of the terrorist.   
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Appendix A  
 
List of Western European countries included in the study: Andorra, 
Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, and Vatican City. 
 
 
Appendix B 
  
Codebook of Variables 
 
Place of attack: The country in which the attack took place. 
 
Type of attack:  
1) Assassination: Targeting one or several specific individuals as 
the aim of the attack. 
2) Armed assault: An attack with the aim of harming human beings 
by using a weapon including firearms, cold weapon, or any other 
kind of hand weapon. 
3) Bombing: An attack where explosive materials are used.  
4) Hijacking: An action to take control of a vehicle. 
5) Hostage taking: An action to take one or several individuals 
hostage to use them to achieve a specific purpose.  
6) Kidnapping: An action to take one or several individuals hostage 
to use them to achieve a specific purpose.  
7) Facility: Any form of attack against a non-human target, such as 
buildings.  
8) Unarmed assault: An attack with the aim of harming human 
beings without using common weapons. 
 
Age: The age of the LAT at the time of the attack.  
 
Gender: The gender of the LAT (male or female).  
 
Previous criminal record: Whether the LAT has been convicted of a 
crime, thus having a criminal record. 
 
Type of previous criminal record: The type of crime that the LAT has 
been convicted of—including armed robbery, drug use, drug trafficking, 
violence, theft, gang-related activities, and radical activities.  
 
Social status: The social status of the LAT relating to social isolation.  
 
Migration status:  
1) First-generation immigrant: The LAT is foreign-born and 
immigrated to the target country after his/her 18th birthday.  
2) Second-generation immigrant: The LAT was born in the 
target country from first-generation immigrant parents. 
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3) 1.5-generation immigrant: The LAT was foreign born but 
immigrated to the target country before early teens. 
4) Native: The LAT was born in the target country from parents 
who also were born in that country.  
5) Refugee: Social, religious, political, or racial problems have 
forced the LAT to leave his/her native country. In the current 
study, a refugee also refers to an LAT who was an asylum 
seeker in the target country. 
6) Unknown: The migration status of the LAT is unknown, or 
there is no available information about it.  
 
Known by intelligence agencies: Whether the LAT was known to the 
intelligence agency of the country in which the attack took place. We 
divided this variable into two classifications that are more specific: 
1) Under monitoring: The intelligence agencies were generally 
monitoring the LAT. 
2) Under surveillance: In addition to being under monitoring, all 
the activities of the LAT (such as his/her social media accounts 
and phone conversations) were specifically under surveillance.  
 
Radicalization process: This variable shows the way in which the LAT 
was radicalized. We divided it into six classifications:  
1) Internet: Radicalization through the Internet. 
2) Prison: The LAT was radicalized while in prison. 
3) Personal network: The LAT was radicalized through his/her 
personal network. 
4) Community network: The LAT was radicalized through being in 
a specific community. (The difference between personal network 
and community network is as follows: In the former, the LAT 
was radicalized through his personal contacts with specific 
individuals he has learned to know. In a community network, 
the LAT was radicalized because of being in a community, and 
he/she would probably never have been radicalized if he/she 
were not a member of that community. 
5) Contact with a terrorist group: The LAT was radicalized by 
having direct physical contact with a terrorist group.  
6) Unknown: The radicalization process of the LAT is unknown. 
 
Ideology: The ideological motivation of the LAT to carry out the attack. 
We divided this variable into five classifications: 
1) Right wing: The LAT has a right wing ideology—including anti-
immigrant, neo-Nazi, and xenophobic views.  
2) Anti-Muslim: The LAT has specific anti-Muslim views. 
3) Anti-Semitic: The LAT has specific anti-Semitic and anti-Jewish 
views. 
4) Islamist: The LAT has radical Islamic views. 
5) Unknown: The ideological motivation of the LAT is unknown.  
 
Type of weapon: Type of weapon used by the LAT in the attack. We 
divided this variable into five classifications: 
1) Firearm. 
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2) Knife or a sharp instrument.  
3) Vehicle. 
4) Incendiary/Arson: Using materials or instruments to cause fire.  
5) Explosive: Dynamite, bombs, grenades, and explosive 
ammunitions. 
 
Target/Victim: This variable discusses which victim/target was the 
main target of the terrorist attack. We divided this variable into six 
classifications: 
1) Civilian: The main targets are common citizens targeted 
randomly. 
2) Government: The main targets are governmental institutions 
and organizations as well as public servants—including police 
officers, soldiers, politicians, and others targeted because of 
their governmental profession. 
3) Religious figure/institution: The main targets are religious 
leaders—such as imams, priests, or rabbis. This classification 
also includes attacks on religious institutions—such as mosques, 
churches, or synagogues.  
4) Private business: The main targets are individuals, places, 
institutions, or organizations targeted because of their financial 
or commercial activities. They may be stores, restaurants, bars, 
or gas stations.  
5) Educational institutions: The main targets are schools, 
universities, colleges, or any other educational institution or 
their staff. 
6) Unknown: Not clear why the LATs chose the specific target.  
 
Fatality: The number of individuals killed in the attack or because of it. 
If killed, the LAT is not included in the count. 
 
Injury: The number of individuals injured because of the attack or 
because of it. If injured, the LAT is not included in the count. 
 
Leakage of information: Refers to the number of LATs who, for any 
reason, leaked information about their coming attack. In this variable, 
the term positive means that the LAT leaked information, negative 
means that the LAT did not leak any information and unknown means 
there was no available information about this variable in the specific 
case. 
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